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It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cog-
nitive bias on account of overcondence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellec-
tual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual
deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators
attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic vir-
tues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can
come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves edu-
cators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner.
The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specied and related
to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series
of objections are considered and responded to.
1. instilling virtue, avoiding bias
What is the purpose of education? I will follow Alvin Goldman in taking it that ‘[t]he fun-
damental goal of education, like that of science, is the promotion of knowledge.’1 Before
considering what it is for something to be a fundamental goal of education, it should be
noted that Goldman is here working with a conception of knowledge that equates knowl-
edge with true belief.2 In other words, taking knowledge to constitute a goal of education
is to take true belief to constitute a goal of education. This being a goal of education
makes sense of the fact that educators typically strive to make sure that any material pre-
sented to students is factually correct (consider controversies regarding teaching creation-
ism) as well as clear and easy to understand and as such not likely to lead to
misunderstandings (consider the use of textbooks as opposed to sometimes esoteric pri-
mary sources, particularly early in the educational process).
There might be other goals of education beside that of knowledge, of course. For one
thing, there are arguably a number of non-epistemic goals relevant to education.
Prominent candidates include those of enabling students to embark on a successful career,
to be morally decent human beings, as well to participate in the democratic process. At the
same time, it seems that the epistemic goal of attaining knowledge is still paramount, at
least in the following sense: Attaining knowledge is conducive to, if not necessary for,
attaining non-epistemic goals like those just mentioned. For example, it will arguably
1 Goldman (1999: 349).
2 See Goldman (1999: 5).
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be hard for students to have a successful career if they don’t know a substantial amount of
things. Moreover, doing the morally right thing requires having an at least largely accurate
picture of the world, since good intentions will do us little good, and might even make for
great harm, if combined with a mistaken view about one’s situation and the likely conse-
quences of one’s options. And, nally, making wise political choices, be it directly or by
electing representatives, requires accurate information about the relevant candidates, the
functioning of society, and about what means are conducive to what political goals.
That the epistemic goal of knowledge is paramount in relation to non-epistemic goals,
in the sense just outlined, does not imply that it is unique in that respect. For one thing,
there might be other epistemic goals, beside knowledge. Plausible candidates include
understanding and wisdom. However, as I have argued elsewhere, we have good reason
to believe that knowledge, in the sense of true belief, is the only epistemic goal.3 For
that reason, I will henceforth assume that (a) knowledge, thus understood, is the only epi-
stemic goal of education, since the only epistemic goal, and (b) the goal of knowledge is
paramount compared with any non-epistemic goals of education, for the reasons provided
in the previous paragraph. That the goal of knowledge thereby is both unique in the epi-
stemic realm and paramount compared with other non-epistemic goals of education is
what warrants saying that the goal of knowledge is the fundamental goal of education,
as Goldman puts it.4
If knowledge is the fundamental goal of education, we have reason to instill epistemic
virtues in students. This follows in so far as there is a legitimate consequentialist notion of
virtue, on which virtues are simply dispositions conducive to achieving goals. Within
moral philosophy, this is the notion of virtue that we nd in John Stuart Mill’s
Utilitarianism.5 For Mill, moral virtues are dispositions that promote moral ends. In
that respect, Mill is not a virtue ethicist, but he has a virtue theory. That is, he doesn’t
dene the good in terms of virtue, but the other way around.6 As he puts it, ‘actions
and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue’.7 For
Mill, who is a hedonist, the end in question is happiness.
3 See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a).
4 Notice that it doesn’t follow from the claim that knowledge is the fundamental goal of education that
educators should be imparting just any pieces of knowledge to their students, including knowledge of
completely trivial matters. As we have seen, knowledge is the fundamental goal of education, partly on
account of the fact that knowledge – in the sense of true belief – is unique in being an epistemic goal.
While knowledge being unique in constituting such a goal entails that only instances of knowledge are
of epistemic non-instrumental value, it does not follow that all instances of knowledge are valuable thus.
It might, for example, be that only signicant instances of knowledge are non-instrumentally valuable.
See Ahlstrom-Vij and Grimm (2013) for an argument to this effect.
5 See Mill (2001/1861). A similar notion can be found in Driver (2001). Others have connected virtue
with utility in a less direct manner than Mill and Driver do. For example, Hume (1975/1777) maintains
that ‘[i]t is the nature and, indeed, the denition of virtue, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable or
approved of by every one who considers or contemplates it. But some qualities produce pleasure,
because they are useful to society, or useful or agreeable to the person himself; others produce it
more immediately’ (261, fn. 1; emphasis in original). Sidgwick (1884) suggests that ‘it is primarily
the volitions to produce certain particular effects which we regard as grounds for attributing virtue’
(224–5), although he nds it ‘difcult to say how far an act which is concerned by the agent to be
good but which is really bad can ever be judged to be virtuous’ (224).
6 See Driver (2001).
7 Mill (2001/1861: 36).
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Two things should be noted. First, a consequentialist about moral virtue does not need
to deny that virtues can be accompanied by certain motivations. For example, for
Aristotle, it would be a motivation to do the virtuous thing for the sake of the noble.
Someone accepting Mill’s virtue theory also does not need to deny that virtues tend to
be acquired in certain ways (if indeed they are), e.g., through experience. What Mill
and other consequentialists about virtue would deny is simply that these things are neces-
sary for possessing virtue. All that is required for virtue possession is the relevant dispos-
ition being such that it promotes happiness.
Second, Mill also does not deny that there are cases in which we value moral virtue in
itself. To the contrary, utilitarians, according to Mill, ‘not only place virtue at the very
head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognize
as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, with-
out looking to any end beyond it’.8 However, here as elsewhere, we must distinguish
between valuing something for its own sake, and something being valuable for its own
sake – and, on Mill’s utilitarianism, only happiness is valuable for its own sake.9
Taking Mill’s theory of moral virtue as our model, we may develop a consequentialist
theory of epistemic virtue. More specically, we may take epistemic virtue – or at least a
kind of epistemic virtue, in so far as we want to be pluralists with respect to notions of
epistemic virtue10 – to consist in a disposition that promotes epistemic goals, including
that of knowledge.11 This is what justies the claim made earlier, to the effect that, if
attaining knowledge is a fundamental goal of education, educators have reason to instill
epistemic virtue in students, the reason being that (consequentialist) epistemic virtue con-
sists exactly in a disposition to promote that goal.
However, one common obstacle to virtue is cognitive bias, i.e., systematic and predict-
able tendencies for inaccurate judgment. Cognitive bias constitutes an obstacle to virtue by
reducing one’s reliability, and making it harder to avoid false belief and thereby also to
attain knowledge. Consequently, given the prevalence of cognitive bias, attaining virtue
is often going to require avoiding bias. From this it follows that, if we have reason to instill
epistemic virtue in students, for the reasons presented above, then we also have reason to
teach students how to avoid bias, since such bias constitutes a common obstacle to achiev-
ing epistemic virtue.
8 Mill (2001/1861: 36; emphasis added).
9 However, see fn. 11.
10 After all, even virtue epistemologists defending non-consequentialist notions of epistemic virtue tend to
accept that there also is a consequentialist notion of epistemic virtue. See, e.g., Baehr (2011: 135), as
well as Battaly (2012) on the virtues attaching to what she refers to as ‘low-grade’ knowledge.
11 Note that Mill eventually makes a move that doesn’t translate to the epistemic case: ‘Virtue, according
to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end [of happiness], but it is capable
of becoming so; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished,
not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness’ (2001/1861: 37). That is, we might start
to derive happiness from exercising virtue. That is not to say that virtue is (or becomes) intrinsically
valuable – only happiness is, and it is virtue leading to happiness that makes it valuable. It is, however,
to say that each instance of virtue may bring happiness, and as such come to have instrumental value.
The same does not happen with epistemic virtue, because it is not a psychological attitude of the sub-
ject that determines its value. What determines its value is it leading to knowledge. As such it might in
the case of epistemic virtue be a good thing that we desire such virtue for its own sake, in so far as
that’s conducive to coming to know, but it does not follow that virtue in any relevant sense thereby
becomes part of the sole bearer of intrinsic epistemic value, i.e., knowledge.
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This brings us to the topic of the present paper, which concerns a problem that presents
itself for educators attempting to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instil-
ling epistemic virtue: we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to bias on account of
overcondence, and thereby fail to listen to advice aimed at reducing bias (Section 2).
This is the problem of intellectual deference. It will be argued that recent research in social
psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps (Section 3),
the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a pro-
cedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justices will be
specied (Sections 4) as well as related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of
epistemic justice (Section 5). Finally, a series of objections will be considered and
responded to (Section 6).
2. overconfidence and the problem of intellectual deference
If what was argued in the previous section is on the right track, educators have reason to
instill epistemic virtue in students, and a derivative but substantive reason to teach stu-
dents how to avoid cognitive bias. However, as mentioned already in the above, when
thinking about how to go about doing the latter, we encounter a problem. In this section,
it will be argued that the relevant problem can be understood as a problem of deference,
and of intellectual deference in particular. But before spelling out the problem, we need to
say something about what constitutes deference.
When we defer to someone, two things happen: we listen to that someone, and believe
what they are saying because they are saying it.12 For present purposes, to listen is simply
to attend to someone’s speech and process the content of what they are saying. As such,
there is an act component to listening (attending to), as well as a more or less automatic
result of performing such acts (processing content). In a moment, we shall discuss some
empirical assumptions regarding the relation between listening and believing what one
is being told. For now, it sufces to note that there is no conceptual connection between
the two. More specically, listening to someone does not necessarily entail taking on
board what one is being told, or being particularly prone to change one’s mind in
case one believes something to the contrary. Listening is certainly compatible with both
(i.e., believing and a willingness to change one’s mind), but entails neither as a matter
of conceptual necessity.
Again, to defer to someone is to listen to them and believe what they are saying because
they are saying it. I will make a simple but potentially controversial, normative assumption
about when we should defer, as follows: knowledge being the epistemic goal, we should
defer to those who know what they are talking about.13 To know what one is talking
12 To say that someone believes what someone else is saying because they’re saying it is to make a mere
causal claim, and not to prejudge the issue of the believer’s epistemic reasons for the relevant belief.
The latter are relevant to whether or not the believer can be said to be justied on the basis of defer-
ence, which is not something that I will take a stand on here. However, if there’s a sense of ‘knowledge’
that has knowledge come out identical to true belief, knowledge (in that sense) does not require jus-
tication or reasons, and believing that p as a causal consequence of being told that p amounts to
knowledge in so far as p is true.
13 See Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013) for a defense of an idea along these lines. Notice, however, that
Hawthorne and Srinivasan, unlike Goldman (1999), do not equate knowledge with true belief,
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about, in the sense employed in so far as we follow Goldman, is to speak the truth.14
Taking someone speaking the truth to constitute a sufcient condition for it being the
case that the hearer should defer to her might be taken to raise worries about blind def-
erence, i.e., cases wherein a hearer should defer to a speaker, on account of her speaking
the truth, without the hearer knowing anything about the speaker’s epistemic credentials.
As I have defended the idea that there is nothing epistemically objectionable about such
blind deference elsewhere, I will not pursue that possibility here.15
Those who still nd the assumption that we should defer to those who know what they
are talking about implausible may note the following: the main upshot of the following
sections is that we have good empirical reason to believe that there are certain things
that sources may do for purposes of making it likely that people will defer to them.
Consequently, so long as we can agree that there are some conditions – whatever they
may be – under which we should defer, what follows will constitute a worthwhile contri-
bution, since it tells us something about what we can do to promote deference where def-
erence is deserved. In that respect, the above assumption about when we should defer is
modular, as far as the purposes of the present paper are concerned. In what follows,
anyone nding the idea that someone knowing what they are talking about is a sufcient
condition for us deferring to that someone altogether implausible should feel free to sub-
stitute their favored sufcient condition for any subsequent instance of the condition sug-
gested above.
Having said something about what constitutes deference, we may now turn to the type
of context of deference that will concern us in what follows. The relevant context involves
educators providing intellectual advice about how to avoid bias, and it – in line with the
assumption just discussed – being the case that students should defer on account of the
educators knowing what they are talking about and thereby providing sound advice.
Providing such advice involves providing a request together with a suggestion for how
to go about one’s epistemic business, a suggestion that’s sound in so far as it’s a good
one. For example, in light of the statistician’s law of large numbers, an educator might
say: ‘Listen, you shouldn’t believe that the features of a small sample will tell you anything
about the features of the population from which it’s drawn.’ When students heed the
request and listen to the educator, they can be said to be complying with that request.
although they suggest that much of what they say would apply to such a notion as well
(see Hawthorne and Srinivasan, 2013: 13).
14 Notice that this disqualies people who believe truly but provide insincere reports from being said to
know what they are talking about, while it qualies people who do not believe what they are saying
but nevertheless speak the truth – consider, e.g., Lackey’s (2008) creationist teacher – as knowing what
they are talking about.
15 See Ahlstrom-Vij (manuscript). Of course, from a rst-person perspective, it is seldom going to be
transparent to me what patterns of deference will have me come to know things. Indeed, in some
cases, my evidence might even lead me astray. That is unfortunate, but does not change the fact of
the matter: if a source knows what she is talking about, what I should do is defer, whether or not
that seems right to me in light of my misleading evidence. One way to bolster this claim is by consider-
ing what I would be inclined to say if, after the fact, I nd out that, contrary to what my evidence sug-
gested, the person did in fact know what she was talking about. In that case, I would say ‘I should’ve
listened.’ (I am grateful to Sandy Goldberg for this suggestion.) That is the fact I am trying to account
for – what we should be doing, given our epistemic goal, whether or not it is always going to be trans-
parent from a rst-person point of view.
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However, students complying with educators’ requests to be listened to does not neces-
sarily make for deference. This is because students might comply with such requests, but
nevertheless fail to believe what they are being told. Given doxastic involuntarism, believ-
ing is not something that we do, so much as something that happens to us. For that
reason, while we can be made to listen – more specically, we can be made to attend
(since an act) and trust that the automatic processing of content that follows upon attend-
ing thus will occur – we cannot be made to believe. Consequently, when thinking about
the relationship between compliance and deference, we should focus on how to increase
the chances that students will defer to (i.e., listen to and believe) educators providing
sound intellectual advice.16 Moreover, as for how to increase the chances thus, I will
make two empirical assumptions:
First, getting someone to listen is conducive to getting that someone to believe what is
being said. This assumption is compatible with people sometimes failing to believe what
they are being told, as long as getting people to listen still serves to increase the chances
that they will believe what they are being told. Indeed, if we did not make that assumption,
it would be hard to make sense of the great majority of persuasive practices, such as those
involving advertisement, political campaigns, and public service announcements, that are
geared exactly towards getting our attention. So, the relevant empirical assumption is this:
while we cannot be made to believe things, we can be made to listen, and trust that there is
an imperfect but still robust enough connection between us listening and us believing the
content of what we hear for listening to increase the chances of belief.17
Second, convincing someone to hold certain normative beliefs in particular (i.e., beliefs
about what one should or should not believe, assume, and so forth) provides us with a
way to indirectly regulate their belief-formation. This is so because believing that one
should believe in a certain manner is conducive to actually believing in that manner.
That is not to say that the former entails the latter, of course. For example, in some
cases, I will not realize that I am making an inference from what is, in fact, a very
small sample. In other cases, I might realize that, but suffer from an epistemic form of
weak will (assuming that there is such a thing). Still, if we assume that my normative
beliefs about how beliefs should be formed have some robust inuence on what beliefs
I do form, there will be a positive relationship between what I believe that I should believe,
and what I will believe. Indeed, this assumption seems to be underlying large parts of what
we do in educational settings, in so far as we try to teach students critical thinking skills.18
16 When asking how we can increase the chances of deference, I am assuming that certain answers (e.g., ‘By
putting a gun to their head’) are ruled out as impermissible on moral grounds or otherwise.
17 This empirical assumption is, of course, compatible with there being other things we can do, beside
bringing people to listen, for purposes of increasing the chances of belief and, as such, of deference.
For example, maybe there is some w such that bringing people to listen and to w would serve to
increase the chances of deference even further, compared with only bringing people to listen. Any
such investigation would not only be compatible with, but also congenial to, the present investigation.
18 There does for present purposes not need to be a strong connection between one’s normative beliefs
and one’s belief-formation. People who fail to believe what they are being told, or fail to have the rele-
vant normative beliefs guide their belief-formation, will be no worse off epistemically than they would
have been, had they not come across the relevant source of intellectual advice. Consequently, any rela-
tion between listening and having one’s beliefs be regulated by the normative beliefs communicated –
even if not a strong one – will be for the better, epistemically speaking. That is, given such a relation,
some will be epistemically better off, and no one will be epistemically worse off. When it comes to
intellectual amelioration, we can do far worse than that.
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Under these two empirical assumptions, promoting deference to educators providing
sound intellectual advice involves as an important component promoting compliance
with requests on the part of said educators to be listened to. Having made that clear,
we are now in a position to formulate the problem educators encounter when attempting
to teach students how to avoid bias. The problem is not that there is no sound advice to be
had. The problem is that, in a wide variety of cases where we should defer to others pro-
viding advice of the relevant kind, e.g., on account of them knowing what they are talking
about and thereby providing sound intellectual advice, we fail to do so. As we shall see,
one common reason that we fail to do so is that we tend to underestimate our tendencies
for bias, and therefore fail to listen, let alone defer. We may refer to this as the problem of
intellectual deference.
To grasp the nature and implications of this problem, we should understand it in the
context of the well-established psychological fact that, depressed people aside,19 most
of us tend to rate ourselves as above average on desirable traits.20 The extent to which
we deem ourselves to be more objective and less biased than others is no exception on
this score. For example, using a variety of measures of objectivity, David Armor found
that approximately 85 per cent of participants rated themselves as more objective than
the average member of the group from which they were drawn.21 Similarly, in a series
of studies by Emily Pronin and colleagues, subjects rated themselves as less susceptible
to each of a number of described biases compared with both the average American and
to various peer groups.22 As Pronin notes in a recent overview on what she terms our
‘bias blind spot’, the upshot of the data collected on the issue is that ‘people tend to rec-
ognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment – except when
that bias is their own’.23
The obvious problem is, of course, that we cannot all be above average. Consequently,
a signicant proportion of us must be mistaken about our own relative insusceptibility to
bias, suggesting that the relevant self-other asymmetry reveals a tendency for overcon-
dence in the accuracy of our judgments. Indeed, the relevant kind of overcondence has
been independently revealed in calibration studies, investigating the extent to which our
degrees of condence tend to track our actual abilities. As it turns out, most of us are
not very well-calibrated, in that we have a tendency to express a greater degree of con-
dence in our answers than is warranted by the extent to which we actually tend to get the
relevant kind of questions right.24 This tendency can be found not only among lay people,
but also among scientists, where the relevant bias takes the form of a tendency to under-
estimate the likelihood of errors.25
In contexts of intellectual advice, the relevant blind spot manifests itself in the hearer
thinking that she does not need to listen to intellectual advice, on account of her
(perceived) relative insusceptibility to bias. Having such a blind spot is compatible with
acknowledging that most people are susceptible to bias, and as such are in need of
19 See Taylor and Brown (1988).
20 See, e.g., Alicke (1985) and Brown (1986).
21 See Armor (1999).
22 See Pronin et al. (2002).
23 Pronin (2007: 37).
24 See, e.g., Fischhoff et al. (1977).
25 See Henrion and Fischhoff (1986).
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intellectual advice. Indeed, the individual might even acknowledge that there are situations
in which she herself could use some intellectual advice – just not in this case. However, in
thinking herself unique, she will be just like the rest of us. Indeed, owing to the prevalence
of bias blind spots, most people tend to think that they are not in need of intellectual
advice, and that either they or their situation in that respect is unique. Factoring in that
most people in a signicant number of cases actually do suffer from cognitive bias, we
get the problem of intellectual deference: in a wide variety of cases where we should
defer to others on matters intellectual, we nevertheless fail to do so on account of failing
to listen.
3. removing our bias blind spots
The previous section introduced the problem of intellectual deference, i.e., the problem
that, in a wide variety of cases where we should defer to others on intellectual matters,
we nevertheless fail to do so. We also saw that one common reason that we fail to
defer is that we fail to listen on account of overcondence, listening being necessary for
deference. What can be done about this?
Return to the kind of intellectual advice that has concerned us in the above, such as that
involved when an educator tells her students: ‘Listen, you shouldn’t believe that the fea-
tures of a small sample will tell you anything about the features of the population from
which it’s drawn.’ The problem discussed in the previous section arises when students
fail to listen to the relevant advice on account of overcondence. That is, since overcon-
dent, they don’t think they need to listen to intellectual advice of this sort (or, indeed, pos-
sibly of any sort).
To address this problem, the educator clearly needs to do more than simply provide the
relevant piece of advice, together with a request to be listened to, since that request is likely
to go unheeded on account of overcondence. What else does she need to do, in order to
get her students to listen?
Maybe the educator can also ask her students to be on the lookout for cognitive biases.
That is, maybe she can try to come to terms with the problem posed by our tendencies for
overcondence by urging some form of critical self-reection on the part of her students.
The problem with doing that, however, is that critically evaluating oneself for bias, for
purposes of correcting any biases uncovered, is exactly what we can not expect someone
with a bias blind spot to do. Owing to that blind spot, we will typically see no reason to
reect critically on the matter.26 Much like in the case of the original advice regarding the
relation between features of samples and the populations from which they are drawn, stu-
dents (like the rest of us) are likely not to see any reason to listen, let alone to engage in
critical self-reection. In other words, the problem with invoking a notion of such self-
reection in an attempt to solve the problem of intellectual deference is that it is part of
the very problem of people not deferring that they will tend not to see the point of reect-
ing critically on the relevant matter.
26 I discuss problems with self-reection approaches to bias identication and correction at greater length
in Ahlstrom-Vij (2013b).
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For that reason, the way to come to terms with our bias blind spots is not by insisting
that we be self-reective, but by having us take part in externally imposed educational pro-
grams, informing us of the limits of our introspective abilities when it comes to identifying
bias. That, at least, is the suggestion coming out of Pronin and Matthew Kugler’s results to
the effect that our bias blind spot is a result of our tendency to rely on introspective infor-
mation when determining whether or not we are subject to bias.27 Since the processes that
give rise to bias typically operate on a sub-personal level, outside the scope of our intro-
spective gaze, our search tends to come up empty. From the fact that our search comes up
empty, we then infer an absence of bias – despite the fact that such a search is more or less
guaranteed to come up empty, given the inaccessibility of the bulk of the relevant opera-
tions. However, Pronin and Kugler also found that subjects who, prior to evaluating the
extent to which they were susceptible to a variety of biases, were asked to read a paper
highlighting the introspective inaccessibility of large parts of our mental lives, showed
less of a tendency to claim that they were less susceptible to bias than their peers.
This, however, is not to suggest that we have thereby solved the problem of intellectual
deference. There are two steps that need to be taken in order to solve that problem: one
negative and one positive. As for the negative step, we need to counteract our bias blind
spot, and thereby remove a prevalent obstacle to us listening to the relevant sources.
Understanding that step in terms of excessive reliance on introspective information,
along the lines of Pronin and Kugler’s ndings, what we need to do is bring people to
the point of not relying so heavily on information they can (or rather: think they can)
uncover by looking inwards. Moreover, doing so might serve to address a subset of the
problematic cases, namely those involving subjects who already believe what they are
being told – e.g., that one should not assume that the features of a small sample tells
one anything about the features of the population from which it is drawn – but simply
fail to have the relevant (normative) beliefs impact their belief-formation, on account of
considering themselves to be relatively unsusceptible to the relevant set of biases due to
their bias blind spots.
But two kinds of cases remain that, moreover, are likely to make up the majority of the
problematic cases: cases wherein people either have no (normative) beliefs on the matter –
about statistical sampling or otherwise – and cases wherein the people involved hold
beliefs that run contrary to the recommendations provided by the sources of intellectual
advice.28 In these cases, simply removing the relevant bias blind spot is not enough.
The reason is that losing a motivation not to listen is not to gain a motivation to listen –
let alone to listen to the people we should – which brings us to the second, positive step: In
addition to having people not rely so heavily on introspective information, we need to
bring people to do something, namely to look outwards, and listen to the sources provid-
ing sound intellectual advice. Only then can we hope to instill or revise the relevant beliefs
in the subjects. So, how can people be brought to listen, under the assumption that listen-
ing is conducive to believing and, as such, to deferring? This is the question that will con-
cern us in the remainder of the paper.
27 See Pronin and Kugler (2007).
28 After all, Tversky and Kahneman (1982) famously suggested that people’s intuitions about random
sampling ‘appear to satisfy the law of small numbers, which asserts that the law of large numbers
applies to small numbers as well’ (25).
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4. people listen to people who listen
The previous section noted that we might be able to remove our bias blind spots by
becoming educated about the limits of introspection, but also that we have not thereby
solved the problem of intellectual deference. The reason is that removing an obstacle to
being motivated to listen is not to provide a motivation for listening, let alone for listening
to the people we should be deferring to, e.g., on account of them providing sound intel-
lectual advice. So how can we motivate people to listen to and, ultimately, defer to sources
that they should be deferring to? In this section, it will be argued that the answer lies in a
notion of procedural justice. In the next section, the relevant notion will be related to
Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic justice.29
The idea behind the notion of procedural justice to be developed builds on an observa-
tion made above (in Section 2), to the effect that what sources of intellectual guidance are
doing is providing a request, together with a piece of intellectual advice.30 The request is
for people to listen to them, while the advice will consist in some concrete and constructive
suggestion for how to go about one’s epistemic business. To use the example from earlier,
an educator might say ‘Listen, you shouldn’t assume that the features of a small sample
will tell you anything about the population from which it’s drawn’. Assuming that the
hearer has been informed about the limits of introspection for the purpose of ridding
her of her bias blind spot, as per the negative step discussed in the previous section, we
can assume her to be open to the idea that the advice is relevant to her, and as such
not be opposed to listening. Moreover, if the hearer heeds the request and listens, and
the two empirical assumptions discussed above hold – i.e., there is a robust enough con-
nection between listening and believing what is being said, and believing that one should
believe in a certain manner is conducive to actually believing in that manner – listening
will increase the chances that the subject will not only defer but also form beliefs
accordingly.
This brings us to what will be argued in this section and the next: There is a kind of
procedural justice that, if practiced by providers of intellectual advice, will increase the
extent to which they are consulted on the relevant matter, as well as the rate of compliance
with their requests for hearers to listen to them – which, under the aforementioned
assumptions, in turn will be correlated with hearers believing what they are being told,
and forming beliefs accordingly. The hypothesis is that by providing intellectual advice
in a procedurally just manner, providers of such advice increase their chances of being per-
ceived by us as just, which in turn can be expected to increase the extent to which we will
consult them, as well as the rate at which we will comply with their requests for being lis-
tened to.
What is the content of the relevant notion of procedural justice? And why consider
this hypothesis at all plausible? The rst question is best answered by way of the second.
The main source of support for the hypothesis comes from Tom Tyler and colleagues’
research into why people follow the law. On a traditional picture, people follow the
29 See Fricker (2007) and Coady (2010), respectively.
30 This should not be taken to imply that intellectual guidance, thus understood, exhausts the domain of
epistemically ameliorative interventions. For example, certain biases will be best dealt with, not by pro-
viding advice to individual agents, but by a social practice of exposure control (see Ahlstrom-Vij,
2013c).
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law because of a fear of sanctions. However, in a landmark study, Tyler showed that fear
of sanctions is not the only or even the most important factor behind why people follow
the law; an equally if not more important factor is people considering the relevant author-
ities legitimate.31 To be legitimate is to be deserving of deference, and to be perceived as
legitimate is to be perceived as being thus deserving. Consequently, perceived legitimacy is
a property that, ‘when it is possessed, leads people to defer voluntarily to decisions, rules,
and social arrangements’.32 More specically, as perceived legitimacy goes up, so does
compliance.33
Moreover, the central factor determining whether people conceive of an authority as
legitimate is the extent to which they perceive that authority to be procedurally just,
which brings us back to the rst question above: What is the content of the relevant notion
of procedural justice? The notion can be dened in terms of four components:
The rst component pertains to being provided with an opportunity to state one’s case.
Let us refer to this condition as input. According to Tyler, ‘[p]eople have a tremendous
desire to present their side of the story and value the opportunity in and of itself’.34 As
such, being given an opportunity to state one’s case has a signicant positive effect on per-
ceived justice – i.e., on people taking someone to be just, in the sense we’re in the process
of spelling out – even when we feel that we have no inuence over the authority’s actual
decision on the matter (e.g., about whether we are to be ned, sentenced, and so forth.).35
The second component of justice is the hearer evaluating one’s input in a way that is
sensitive only to the facts of the matter, not to the hearer’s personal preferences or preju-
dices. Let us refer to this as factuality.
The third component corresponds to the fact that, while people do not require that
their input be reected in the ultimate decision, they must be able to infer that what
has been said at the very least has been considered.36 Let us refer to this condition as con-
sideration. As discussed by Tyler, the relevant condition is fairly weak: in many cases, sim-
ply explaining that the input was considered but, unfortunately, could not inuence the
decision is sufcient for satisfying the consideration condition.
The fourth and nal component of justice involves the authorities making an effort to
satisfy the above conditions, as opposed to simply going through the motions. Let us refer
to this component as effort.
If people feel that they have been treated in a procedurally just manner – i.e., if they feel
that the input, factuality, consideration, and effort conditions have been satised – they
perceive the relevant authority to be just, which in turn has them consider the authority
more legitimate, as well as increases their compliance with the laws laid down by that
authority. In fact, perceptions of justice can give rise to a feedback loop, in that, when
authorities are viewed as legitimate, their actions are more likely to be seen as being
just.37,38
31 See Tyler (2006a).
32 Tyler (2006b: 376).
33 See Tyler (2006a: 57).
34 Tyler (2006a: 147).
35 Tyler (2006a: 127).
36 See Tyler (2006a: 149).
37 See Tyler (2006a: 107).
38 In some places (e.g., in Blader and Tyler 2003), Tyler talks about a four-component model of proced-
ural justice. In those contexts, the components correspond to the dimensions along which people
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The following are two extensions of these results that are relevant to our
investigation:
First, the relationship between perceived procedural justice – i.e., the perceived satis-
faction of the four conditions just outlined – perceived legitimacy, and compliance is not
unique to the legal domain; it applies to rule-following more generally. For example,
employee perceptions regarding the justice of corporate policies, and the resulting
perception of the legitimacy of their employers, tracks employee compliance with cor-
porate policies,39 as well as cooperative behavior more generally, including compliance
with rules in the absence of explicit requests for compliance or threats of sanctions.40
The same goes for non-corporate employees, such as police ofcers and members of
the military, who, too, are signicantly more inclined to comply with attempts to regu-
late their performance in so far as they deem their employers to be just, and thereby
legitimate.41
Second, perceived procedural justice is not just relevant to our tendency to comply with
communicated rules or norms – i.e., doing what we are being told to do – but also to our
willingness to engage in consultation, i.e., seeking advice on what is to be done in the rst
place. For example, on the question of whom to consult, people report being more prone
to consult professionals regarding retirement saving and investment strategies who they
perceive to be just than professionals who they do not perceive to be just, even when
aware that the cost of receiving a just treatment would be a decreased likelihood of nan-
cial gain.42 Moreover, as for the question of whether to consult someone, students report
being more likely to seek advice from their professors on academic as well as on personal
matters, when they take the professors to be such that they would treat them in a just
manner.43
In other words, within a wide variety of domains, we have reason to believe that people
are signicantly more inclined, not simply to consult others in the rst place, but also to
comply with requests or recommendations provided in consultations, when those con-
sulted are perceived to be just. In other words, the causal relationship between the relevant
components can be illustrated as follows:Ă
evaluate procedural justice, namely with respect to decision-making, quality of treatment, formal inter-
actions, and informal interactions. By contrast, the four components discussed here pertain to what
Tyler and colleagues’ research suggests constitutes the content of justice evaluations, in the sense of
what we look for when evaluating people’s behavior or the structure of organizations, along aforemen-
tioned dimensions or otherwise.
39 See Tyler and Blader (2005).
40 See Tyler (2011: Chapter 3). To avoid confusion, I have ignored a possible terminological shift
between Tyler’s earlier (e.g., his 2006a) and his more recent work (e.g., his 2011). In the former,
what I have referred to as the input and consideration conditions are conditions on perceived proced-
ural justice; in the latter, these are occasionally (e.g., 2011: 106) but not consistently (e.g., 2011: 114)
treated as conditions on perceived trustworthiness, where the latter is treated as a separate contribu-
tory factor to perceived legitimacy, in addition to that of perceived procedural justice (see, e.g., his
2011: 112). Since this terminological shift makes no substantive difference, I will stick to Tyler’s earlier
terminology, and take perceived trustworthiness – if that’s the term we should use for what’s captured
by input and consideration – to be a component of perceived procedural justice.
41 See Tyler et al. (2007).
42 Tyler (2006c: Study 1 and 2).
43 Tyler (2006c: Study 3).
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Indeed, the robustness of the relationship between perceived justice and compliance as
well as consultation suggests that it can be invoked in order to come to terms with com-
pliance problems generally. That is the motivation for the present hypothesis, to the effect
that there is a form of procedural justice that, if practiced by sources providing intellectual
advice, can be expected to increase the extent to which their requests to be listened to are
being heeded in virtue of the effect of perceived justice on compliance and consultation
rates. More specically, applying the four conditions on procedural justice identied
above – i.e., input, factuality, effort, and consideration – the relevant sources can both
increase consultation rates and promote compliance with their requests for being listened
to by making sure that they (a) provide people with an opportunity for input on the rele-
vant matters, (b) evaluate such input in a factual manner, (c) offer an explanation in cases
where that input, after having been considered, cannot inuence their advice, and (d )
make an effort to do what it takes to satisfy the input, factuality, and consideration
conditions.
If we were to formulate a slogan capturing what sources need to do in order to get us to
defer – assuming, as above, that listening is to a robust enough extent conducive to believ-
ing what one is being told – it would be this: people listen to people who listen. In formu-
lating the slogan thus, I am making an assumption about the relationship between
perceived justice and de facto justice, to the effect that the best way to seem just is to




! Procedural ! ! +
Justice Legitimacy
Justice Compliance
Assuming such a relationship between perceived and de facto procedural justice is not
to deny that it is conceptually possible to solve compliance problems by simply seeming to
be just. It should be noted, however, that it is not only unlikely that one would be able to
pull off the level of deception required in the long run, but also unclear what would be
gained from it. After all, maintaining the relevant deception for the purposes of merely
seeming just would most likely require an equal if not greater amount of resources than
would simply being just. In other words, the best way to have people perceive sources
of intellectual advice to be just is for those sources to make a sincere effort to provide a
forum for input, and taking into account what is being said in a factual manner, where
the relevant consideration involves also explaining why the input does not change the
advice given in cases where it does not.
Naturally, focusing on what sources providing sound intellectual advice can do to pro-
mote consultation and compliance by way of procedural justice, in the manner that we
have done so far, might raise worries about epistemic sources that we should not defer
to – e.g., because they do not know what they’re talking about, nor satisfy any other
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sufcient condition relevant to whom we should be deferring to – nevertheless being able
to practice procedural justice and, thereby, bring about consultation and deference. This
worry speaks to the observation that bringing people to defer to the sources of intellectual
advice they should be deferring to is really only half the problem of intellectual deference.
The other half is that of also bringing people not to defer to sources of intellectual advice
to which they should not defer.
Notice, however, that the two halves of the problem are not independent of one
another. In particular, the more successful we are with respect to solving the rst half
of the problem – i.e., that of bringing people to defer to the sources they should defer
to, e.g., on account of those sources providing sound intellectual advice, or satisfying
some other sufcient condition on obligated intellectual deference – the more successful
we will be with respect to the second half of the problem. This is so under the assumption
that there is a practical limit to how many sources any given person can defer to. Given
such a limit, increased success in bringing people to defer to the sources they should
defer to will, in effect, also serve the goal of bringing people to defer only to those sources.
5. varieties of epistemic justice
As should be clear from the previous sections, the relevant kind of procedural justice
would be practiced, not by those on the receiving end of intellectual advice, but by the
sources of advice themselves. We might say that it is a speaker-centered form of justice.44
As such, it might be contrasted with the notion of epistemic justice presented by Miranda
Fricker, and with her notion of testimonial justice in particular.45 Fricker’s notion of tes-
timonial justice captures, we might say, a hearer-centered form of justice. More speci-
cally, it is a hearer-centered anti-prejudicial form of justice achieved through critical
self-reection. Prejudice consists in an epistemically culpable resistance to evidence for a
speaker’s trustworthiness, sometimes combined with a negative and ethically culpable
affective investment on the part of the hearer. The relevant kind of justice involves the
hearer ‘shift[ing] intellectual gear out of spontaneous, unreective mode and into active
critical reection in order to identify how far [a] suspected prejudice has inuenced her
judgment’.46
44 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for this suggestion.
45 See Fricker (2007).
46 Fricker (2007: 91). Fricker refers to this as the corrective form of testimonial justice. She wants to also
leave room for a naïve manifestation of testimonial justice (93). She discusses two kinds of naïve mani-
festation: rst, someone who simply happens to lack the relevant prejudices, while possessing a general
motivation to make unprejudiced credibility judgments; and, second, someone who has prejudiced
beliefs that for whatever reason fail to inuence her credibility judgments in testimonial interactions.
It is not clear, however, that these two kinds of cases should be categorized as instances of testimonial
justice, naïve or not. According to Fricker, the virtue of testimonial justice ‘requires the hearer to reli-
ably neutralize prejudice in her judgments of credibility’ (92). Since a person may be free of prejudice
and possess a motivation to remain unprejudiced, while lacking an ability to reliably neutralize preju-
dice, had she been subject to any, it is not clear that the rst kind of case should be taken to involve
testimonial justice. Moreover, since a person’s prejudiced beliefs might fail to corrupt her credibility
judgments without it being the case that, had her beliefs in fact corrupted her judgments, she would
have been able to reliably neutralize the corrupting inuence, it also is not clear that the second
kind of case should qualify as involving testimonial justice. Hence, my focus on the corrective form
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That said, the distinction between hearer- and speaker-centered forms of justice does
not get to an essential difference between Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice and the
notion of procedural justice developed here. After all, there is nothing that prevents speak-
ers from manifesting Fricker’s anti-prejudicial virtue of testimonial justice, for example in
deciding whom to address. The real difference between Fricker’s notion and the proced-
ural notion relevant in contexts of intellectual deference is that the former pertains speci-
cally to prejudice, while the latter does not. More specically, as Fricker understands
testimonial justice, it guarantees that one is not prejudiced in one’s evaluations of people’s
trustworthiness. As such, testimonial justice might go some lengths towards helping us sat-
isfy the factuality condition, but not necessarily towards satisfying the remaining three
conditions provided in the previous section. The reason is this:
Those in most need of intellectual advice might be least worthy of one’s ear, from an
epistemic perspective. Moreover, someone who refuses to listen to someone who has noth-
ing epistemically relevant to say is not thereby prejudiced. Still, if the above is on the right
track, and one way to promote deference is to listen to people in the manner outlined in
the previous section, we might in some contexts – including those that involve providing
intellectual advice in educational settings – need to listen to people who actually have
nothing to say. Doing that, however, is not something that the testimonially just person
needs to be doing. A testimonially just person listens in an unprejudiced manner, but is
not required to listen to anyone in particular, let alone to people who have nothing rele-
vant to say.
It should be stressed that this is not a critique of Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice.
The question of what to do in light of the fact that people’s evaluations of other’s credibil-
ity sometimes are colored by prejudice – including prejudice pertaining to race, sexuality,
and gender – is very different from the question of what to do in the face of the problem of
intellectual deference. For that reason, what has been argued so far should not be taken to
suggest that Fricker’s notion cannot do what she wants it to do, namely address problems
arising on account of prejudice, and centrally negative identity prejudice. Nor is it being
suggested that the notion of procedural justice developed here can replace Fricker’s. For
example, it would be downright insulting to suggest that what a hearer subject to preju-
dicial treatment on account of her race should be doing is spend more time listening to her
racist interlocutors.47
Instead, the only thing suggested is this: Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice cannot do
what needs to be done in relation to the problem of intellectual deference. Hence, the need
for a different notion of justice in testimonial contexts, and in testimonial contexts involving
the provision of intellectual advice in particular, in addition to (not instead of) that provided
by Fricker through her notion of testimonial justice. Exercising the relevant kind of proced-
ural justice involves listening without epistemic discrimination, in the specic sense of listen-
ing without any regard for the epistemic merits of what is being said, and then explaining
why what is being said has no bearing on the correct intellectual recommendation, in cases
where it does not. By listening without discrimination in this manner, we are making an
effort – hopefully perceived by the agent as such – to make any given person feel that
they are provided with an opportunity for input. By moreover evaluating that input in a
of testimonial justice, which in light of the above seems to be the form that is most in line with what
Fricker herself takes testimonial justice to consist in.
47 I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.
procedural justice and the problem of intellectual deference
episteme volume 11–4 437
manner only sensitive to the facts, and explaining why that input cannot be taken to alter
the verdict on what is the right intellectual recommendation in the relevant case, we are also
trying to make people feel that their views are still given consideration in a factual manner,
whether or not those views factor into the relevant recommendation.
At this point, it might be objected that there is something impracticable about the rele-
vant kind of procedural justice, since it seems to require that we listen to absolutely every-
one. How could we possibly hope to do so?48 The answer is of course that, in the great
majority of cases, we cannot, but that practicing procedural justice also does not require
us to do so. Such justice is compatible with putting constraints on whom one listens to,
including constraints motivated by practical considerations. What is central to the kind
of procedural justice relevant here is simply that we do not impose any epistemic con-
straints, as in constraints motivated by the epistemic merits of what is being said.
The point that there might be several notions of justice relevant in epistemic contexts is
in line with a recent suggestion by David Coady.49 Coady argues that, in addition to
Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice, which as we have seen highlights unjust credibility
decits, we need to acknowledge that there also are epistemic injustices pertaining to the
distribution of epistemic goods. The latter kind of injustice occurs ‘when someone’s right
to know is violated’.50 Coady explains:
[. . .] a person can have their right to know something violated in two distinguishable ways. They
can be unjustly put (or left) in a position in which they are ignorant of something that they are
entitled to know, or they can be unjustly put (or left) in a position in which they are wrong
about something they are entitled to be right about. There seems no reason to think that either
of these is inherently more of an injustice than the other. (Coady 2010: 109)
Clearly, Coady’s distributive notion of epistemic justice is different from the procedural
notion of justice that has been defended in the above. Moreover, there is no reason to
believe that the two are in conict with one another. To the contrary, the notion defended
here complements Coady’s rather nicely. We started out our investigation by thinking
about how to instill epistemic virtues in students, for purposes of enabling them to attain
knowledge, and found that we might be able to facilitate such attainments through a
notion of procedural justice, given the prevalence of cognitive bias as an obstacle to virtue.
For that reason, the notion of procedural justice developed above can serve as a means to
correcting exactly the kind of epistemic injustices that Coady is calling our attention to, by
ridding those concerned of bias, paving the way for epistemic virtue, and thereby also
reducing ignorance and correcting errors, including in cases of unjust ignorance and error.
To sum up, the notion of procedural justice defended here is distinct from but in no
way in conict with the notions of epistemic justice defended by Fricker and Coady.51
In fact, the relevant notion of procedural justice can be utilized for purposes of mitigating
cases of epistemic justice, at least as understood by Coady. However, that in itself does not
48 I’m grateful to Miranda Fricker for raising this question.
49 See Coady (2010).
50 Coady (2010: 105).
51 Coady (2010) suggests that there is a tension between his notion of distributive epistemic justice and
Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice. I remain neutral on the questions whether there is such a tension
for present purposes; all that matters for our investigation is that there is no tension between the notion
of procedural justice defended here and the notions defended by Fricker and Coady, respectively.
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go to show that the former notion will not prove problematic on some other ground. Let
us consider some possible objections.
6. objections
First, it might be objected that the legal cases at the heart of the research on the role of
procedural justice and deference are simply too different from the cases that concern us
in so far as we are worrying about the problem of intellectual deference. More specically,
return to one of the three problematic cases discussed at the end of Section 3, wherein a
subject holds beliefs that run contrary to the recommendation provided by the source of
intellectual advice, and thereby disagrees with the source. In light of this kind of case,
someone might highlight the following disanalogy with the legal case: you can go along
with a law you do not agree with (e.g., because you do not want to face sanctions, or
because you consider the law-giver legitimate), but since belief-formation is not open to
voluntary control, you cannot believe a recommendation you do not believe in, no
matter how severe the sanctions or how legitimate you consider the source of the
recommendation.
Clearly, there is such a disanalogy, but does it present a problem for the present sug-
gestion that we may solve the problem of intellectual deference with reference to a notion
of procedural justice? It does not. The reason is that the relevant analogy is not between
believing and following the law, but between listening and following the law. Moreover,
here is something we can certainly do: we can listen to a source of intellectual advice, even
if we don’t agree with what she’s saying. Why is that signicant? If what I have suggested
is on point, being brought to listen will increase the chances of belief (or, in this case:
belief-change), and as such of deference. Hence, the main question of this paper: How
can people be brought to listen? Since people listen to people who listen, sources will listen
for purposes of in turn having people listen to them. As noted several times already, listen-
ing does not guarantee believing what one is being told, particularly not in the face of
belief to the contrary. Rather, in accordance with what is taken for granted by any practice
involving attempts to bring people to believe things – even in cases where the people
involved believe the opposite – we are merely trying to increase the chances of belief or
belief-change, and assume that bringing people to listen stands a good chance of doing
exactly that.
Let us consider a second objection. The claims made here about procedural justice are
both empirical and conceptual in nature. The empirical claim is that sources satisfying the
input, factuality, consideration, and effort conditions increase the chances that people will
consult as well as listen to them. The conceptual claim is that those conditions capture a
notion of procedural justice. Someone might object that the preceding sections do not give
us sufcient reason to talk of the conditions identied as capturing a form of procedural
justice. To such a person it might be worth it to point out that what ultimately matters for
purposes of this paper is that there are certain conditions that, if satised, help us solve the
problem of intellectual deference, in accordance with the above empirical claim. I nd it
helpful to refer to the joint satisfaction of those conditions as procedural justice, particu-
larly given their roots in Tyler’s research as well as their place in the larger matrix of epis-
temically relevant notions of justice discussed in the previous section. That said, I am not
particularly interested in conceptual legislation.
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A third objection is this: it has been suggested that providers of sound intellectual
advice should listen without epistemic discrimination, including to those who might be
gravely mistaken and as such have nothing to say, in order to bring about consultation
and compliance. Moreover, an empirical assumption was made about the relation
between compliance and deference, to the effect that listening to someone is conducive
to believing what one is being told. But given that assumption, there is a danger that
those made to listen without discrimination, for purposes of practicing the relevant
kind of procedural justice, might actually start believing what they are being told by peo-
ple who are gravely mistaken – or so the objection goes.
In response, it should be noted that, if there’s anything that’s likely to block the route
from listening to deference it’s the ability of the informed to see that those who are gravely
mistaken are just that. Indeed, were it not the case that the informed typically are able to
do so, education would generally be a failure. However, education is not generally a fail-
ure, and to the extent that there are challenges associated with the epistemic asymmetry
characterizing educator-student relationships, it seems safe to assume that those challenges
rarely if ever stem from an inability of educators to listen to the gravely mistaken without
becoming convinced that they are, in fact, informed. In other words, while it is not strictly
speaking impossible that the informed are in some cases misled by those gravely mistaken,
it seems safe to assume that it is likely that the informed will tend not to defer, on account
of being able to tell that the gravely mistaken are indeed just that.
A fourth objection to what has been argued in the above is that there is something
questionable, maybe even objectionable, about practicing the relevant kind of procedural
justice. Often, we listen to people because we are interested in hearing what they are say-
ing, and not primarily for the purpose of having them listen to us in turn. If educators or
other people in the business of providing sound intellectual advice listen to us primarily
for purposes of having us listen to them, is there a sense in which they are using us? I
am inclined to say ‘no’, the reason being this: while it would make sense to talk about
people using us if the purpose of getting us to listen would be for them to gain something
(think advertisement), the contexts that concern us here involve attempts to get us to listen
for the purpose of benetting us. If we can be brought to listen to sources providing sound
intellectual advice, we are not being used – on the contrary, we are being helped.
Specically, we are being helped to become better thinkers.
7. conclusion
Educators have reason to instill epistemic virtues in students, on account of how epistemic
virtues constitute dispositions conducive to epistemic goals, such as knowledge, which
also happens to be the fundamental goal of education. Moreover, since cognitive bias con-
stitutes a common obstacle to such virtue, educators also have reason to teach students
how to avoid bias. The problem is that it is a well-established fact that we often fail to
listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing bias on account of us being overcondent
about our intellectual abilities, and thereby underestimating our susceptibility to bias.
This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper argued that recent research
in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps,
the second of which involves educators delivering their intellectual advice in a procedur-
ally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justices were
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specied and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of testimonial justice.
Finally, a series of objections were considered and responded to.52,53
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